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a shift in Sutherland's disciplinary and methodological outlook resulted in a theory that virtually required him to destroy individual-level, or nonsociological, perspectives on crime. The Gluecks advocated a multiple-factor theory of crime, which to Sutherland represented a threat to the intellectual status of sociological criminology. Hence, Sutherland's attack was aimed largely at extinguishing their interdisciplinary model so that sociology could establish proprietary rights to criminology. Although Sutherland's coup was successful at the time and remains so in some circles today, we demonstrate that in important respects it was unfounded and driven by a distorted version of both sociological positivism and the Gluecks' research. At the same time we show how the Gluecks' professional interests contributed to their own demise.
To substantiate our claims we examine in detail a previously unanalyzed debate between Edwin Sutherland and the Gluecks about the causes of crime and proper methods of social science research. After a period of initial harmony in the late 1920s and early 1930s, the Sutherland-Glueck exchange became heated and took on the trappings of an intellectual shoot-out that lasted some 15 years. This is the period when Sutherland was developing his famous theory of differential association and the Gluecks were studying the development of criminal careers and the effectiveness of correctional treatment in reducing criminal behavior. The material we analyze includes both published works and previously unavailable correspondence as well as unpublished papers. We uncovered the correspondence and unpublished manuscripts, along with the original raw data for the Gluecks' studies, in the archives of the Harvard Law School Library. The correspondence, unpublished papers, and raw data provide a unique glimpse into the formation and development of some of the major criminological works of our time. As Schuessler has argued, "Sutherland's contribution to criminology consisted as much in his informal papers and letters as in his published writing" (1973, p. xxiii). We believe the same is true of the Gluecks.
We also place the competing research paradigms of the Gluecks and Sutherland in the socio-intellectual and institutional context in which they found themselves. We argue that the formation and substance of their theoretical positions were deeply affected by their respective methodological and disciplinary biases. To understand the latter, we found it necessary to uncover the contextual factors relating to the intellectual climate and social positions to which each party was witness (see esp. Jones 1977 Jones , 1986 Camic 1987; Beirne 1987; Laub 1983 ).
Finally, we reassess the Gluecks' research findings in light of recent criminological advances and the test of time. In so doing we identify four substantive and methodological characteristics of the Glueck perspective that have captured center stage in current research. These include such salient issues as age and crime, the value of longitudinal research, criminal careers, and social control theory. We show that, although largely unacknowledged today, the Gluecks' substantive contributions are fundamental to theory and research in the study of crime.
HISTORICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT
The historical context and institutional affiliations of the Gluecks had an important effect on their methodological stance and later dealings with Sutherland in three respects. First, unlike Sutherland's, the Gluecks' educational background was eclectic and interdisciplinary in nature. Sheldon 
(Both Sheldon and Eleanor Glueck
were also given honorary doctorates by Harvard University in 1958.) As a team the Gluecks were thus not beholden to any one discipline in an "a priori" sense, and, as a result, they published extensively in the leading journals of criminology, social work, psychology, sociology, education, law, and psychiatry.5 As will become more apparent below, the price they paid for such an interdisciplinary outlook was steep. Indeed, as Geis recognized over 20 years ago, "the Gluecks belong to no single academic discipline, and they are suffering the declasse fate of aliens and intruders" (1966, p. 188).
Second, the Gluecks' social positions within the academic community 3 Sheldon Glueck's (1925) Ph.D. thesis crosscut the interests of sociology, law, and psychiatry, focusing on criminal responsibility, mental disorder, and criminal law. 4 Eleanor Glueck's early research focused on the sociology of education (community and schools) and the evaluation of research methods in social work (1927, 1936 ; see also Gilboy 1936 and Vaillant 1980) . 5A bibliography of the Gluecks' works from 1923 to 1963 is published in Glueck and Glueck (1964) .
were unique at the time and would be even today. After teaching a few years in the Department of Social Ethics at Harvard, Sheldon Glueck was appointed to the Harvard Law School as assistant professor of criminology in 1929. He became a full professor in 1931 and was appointed the first Roscoe Pound Professor of Law in 1950 (Current Biography Yearbook 1957). Sheldon Glueck's position as a professor of criminology in a law school was an unusual institutional arrangement that led him to a somewhat isolated and "outcast" perspective. Specifically, although law professors and students do not often conduct (or reward) social science research, that was his specialty and main interest. Moreover, research on the causes of crime was a particular anomaly in the law school setting, though it should be noted that during the 1930s the Harvard Law School had a tradition of research on the administration of justice (e.g., the Cleveland Crime Survey and the Harvard Crime Survey). Sheldon Glueck's institutional arrangement was a structural constraint in yet another crucial respect-there was no opportunity to train Ph.D. students who might carry on the Gluecks' research agenda.6 Perhaps more salient was the institutional treatment accorded Eleanor Glueck. Although armed with a doctorate in education and a prolific publishing record,7 Eleanor Glueck was unable to secure a tenured faculty position or any teaching position at Harvard. In fact, she was employed from 1930 to 1953 as a research assistant in criminology at the Harvard Law School.8 Some 20 years after her appointment as a research assistant she was "promoted" to research associate in criminology in 1953, a position she retained until 1964. At the same time, from 1929 to 1964, she was codirector of the project on the causes and prevention of juvenile delinquency. In short, three factors worked together to develop a fiercely independent, interdisciplinary, and even iconoclastic outlook on the part of the Gluecks. In particular, interdisciplinary educational training, coupled with Sheldon Glueck's unusual position in the law school and apparent gender discrimination against Eleanor Glueck, served to create almost a bunker mentality on the part of the Gluecks, especially regarding Harvard sociology.'0 The Gluecks were also constrained by their lack of involvement in the training of graduate students. Added to this was the intellectual diversity of a set of colleagues who fostered empirical research beyond the confines of any one discipline. It is only within this context that we can now understand the Gluecks' theoretical and methodological perspective.
The Glueck Perspective
During their 40-year career at the Harvard Law School, the Gluecks produced four major data bases relating to crime and delinquency. The first was the study of 510 male offenders from the Massachusetts Reformatory during the period 1911-22. These offenders were studied over a 15-year span, which resulted in three books (Glueck and Glueck 1930 , 1937a , 1943 . A second although similar study of women incarcerated at the Women's Reformatory resulted in the publication of Five Hundred Delinquent Women (1934b). A third major research effort focused on a sample of juveniles who had been referred by the Boston juvenile court 10 Harvard sociology in the 1930s has been described as "intellectually ill-defined" (Camic 1987, p. 425) . The powers that did exist (e.g., Sorokin, Parsons, and Homans) certainly did not consider the study of crime to be central to the mission of sociology (see Faculty Committee Report 1954, and Cohen's interview in Laub [1983] ). In fact, the parallel between Parsons's pursuit of general sociological theory at Harvard (see Camic 1987 ) and Sutherland's at Indiana is striking. It should also be noted that both Sheldon and Eleanor Glueck were Jewish. One can speculate that discrimination against Jews at Harvard University (see Laub 1983 , p. 185) may have also contributed to isolating the Gluecks from the mainstream academic community. to the Judge Baker Foundation (the existing court clinic at the time). These results were published in One Thousand Juvenile Delinquents (1943a), and a follow-up analysis 10 years later produced Juvenile Delinquents Grown Up (1940). The results of these studies are summarized in a volume entitled After-Conduct of Discharged Offenders (1945). Finally, the work the Gluecks are best known for is Unraveling Juvenile Delinquency (1950a). This major study of the formation and development of criminal careers was initiated in the 1940s and involved a sample of 500 delinquents and 500 nondelinquents matched case-by-case on age, race/ ethnicity, general intelligence, and low-income residence-all classic criminological variables thought to influence both delinquency and official reaction. Over a 17-year period the Gluecks conducted an extensive follow-up of the original Unraveling sample, which resulted in the publication of Delinquents and Nondelinquents in Perspective (1968; see also Glueck and Glueck 1970) .
The Gluecks' methodological approach to the study of crime can be characterized by three distinct features. The first is an emphasis on longitudinal and follow-up prediction studies, including, when possible, control groups for comparative purposes. Second, the Gluecks' work emphasized a criminal career focus, especially the study of serious persistent offenders (1950a, p. 13). Related to this was the Gluecks' thought that the study of the formation, development, and termination of criminal careers was an important research priority, and that the causes of the initiation of crime were distinct from the causes of continuing crime and processes of desistance (Glueck and Glueck 1930, p. 257; 1934b, p. 282; 1945 , p. 75, n. 1). Third, the Gluecks stressed the importance of collecting multiple sources of information (e.g., parent, teacher, self-report) in addition to official records of delinquency.
As for substantive findings, the Gluecks, like Goring ([1913] 1972), uncovered the important relationship between age and criminality. They argued that age of onset was a key factor in terms of etiology and policy and that career criminals started very young in life. The Gluecks also stressed that crime declined substantially with age. Specifically, in all of their research the Gluecks found that, as the population of offenders aged, their crime rate declined. Furthermore, even among those who continued offending, the seriousness of the offenses declined (Glueck and Glueck 1940 , 1943 , 1945 , 1968 . The Gluecks sought to understand the age-crime curve in terms of maturational reform. As we will see, not only was the relationship between age and crime one of the major sources of their battle with Sutherland, it foreshadowed a contemporary debate along similar lines.
Research by the Gluecks also revealed the stability of delinquent patterns over the life cycle. They argued that the data showed "beyond a reasonable doubt that, in all of life's activities considered in this inquiry, the men who as boys comprised our sample of juvenile delinquents have continued on a path markedly divergent from those who as juveniles had been included in the control group of nondelinquents" (Glueck and Glueck 1968, pp. 169-70). The Gluecks' hypothesis regarding the stability of deviance would also turn out to be a major sticking point with those advocating a sociological perspective.
According to the Gluecks, the most important factor that distinguished delinquents from nondelinquents in early life was thefamily. In particular, the Gluecks (1950a) developed a prediction scale of delinquency that centered on family variables-disciplinary practices, supervision by parents, and child-parent attachment. Those families with lax discipline combined with erratic and threatening punishment, poor supervision, and weak emotional ties between parent and child were found to generate the highest probability of delinquency. Although a focus on the family was to become extremely unpopular in sociology during the 1950s and 1960s, it was one of the Gluecks' major interests.
Perhaps most important, the Gluecks promoted a multidisciplinary perspective and had little patience for those criminologists who were wedded to any one particular discipline. As a result the Gluecks rejected unilateral causation whether sociological, biological, or psychological in focus and embraced instead a multiple causal approach that emphasized differentiation between offenders and nonoffenders. This approach is seen most clearly in Unraveling, in which they focused not only on the family, but on school, opportunities (peers and use of leisure time), formal sanctions (e.g., arrest, probation, prison), personality development, temperament, and constitutional factors such as body structure (e.g., mesomorphy). As they stated, "The separate findings, independently gathered, integrate into a dynamic pattern which is neither exclusively biologic nor exclusively socio-cultural, but which derives from an interplay of somatic, temperamental, intellectual, and socio-cultural forces" (1950a, p. 281). The Gluecks, along with Healy (1915; see also Healy and Bronner 1926), thus established the multiple-factor approach to the study of crime.
Overall, the Gluecks were stubbornly driven by what their data revealed and refused to pigeonhole their interpretations into any one disciplinary box, tempted though they were. This emphasis on fact gathering prevented them from ever developing a systematic theoretical framework. As they argued, "Neither 'hunches' nor theoretical speculations, can conjure away the facts, even though those facts may not fit neatly into various preconceptions about human nature and crime causation" (1951, p. 762 We will return later to the validity of the Gluecks' major research findings regarding such issues as age and crime, family processes, and the stability of crime and deviance across the life course. For now, we hope to have established the basic Glueck perspective and placed it in the historical and institutional context specified above. In similar fashion we turn our attention next to the Gluecks' major contemporary and critic.
The Initial Sutherland Perspective
In 1924 which "need to be very detailed and pursued from early infancy to old age" (1924, pp. 86-87). This strategy would also extend to "mental and educational tests," as well as interviews with parents, teachers, and a full recording of all "conduct disorders." It is interesting that this is exactly the sort of methodological strategy followed by the Gluecks.
Sutherland was later to become vehemently antipsychiatry, but there was little evidence of this stance in his early writings on the substantive predictors of crime. For example, he noted the association between psychopathic personality and criminality and, in fact, argued that "there is good reason to believe that the psychopathic personalities, and especially those of the egocentric type, will get into difficulty with other people more frequently than the average individual" (1924, p. 123). Sutherland, like the Gluecks, also maintained that the family was a crucial variable in understanding delinquency: "Those homes with extremely rigid discipline, extremely lax discipline, or inconsistent discipline are developing many children with personalities that are socially undesirable and incline toward delinquency" (1924, p. 147). And, perhaps most ironic, Sutherland acknowledged openly the potential effects of biology on delinquency, noting possible mediating effects of social factors (1924, p. 180). Much like the Gluecks would later argue, Sutherland wrote that "it is not the physical defect itself that produces delinquency, but the social and other conditions surrounding the defective person" (1924, p. 180). In the 1920s Sutherland was thus a multiple-factor theorist. He in fact admitted as much, stating later in an address to the Ohio Valley Sociological Association, "I had a congeries of discrete and co-ordinate factors, unrelated to each other, which may be called multiple-factor theory" (in Schuessler 1973, p. 14).
Sutherland's favorable inclination toward the multiple-factor perspective also extended to his early communication with the Gluecks. The early correspondence between the Gluecks and Sutherland covered the period from February 26, 1929, to May 15, 1936. There are more than 40 pieces of correspondence over this time period. 12 Our inspection of the full body of materials reveals a cordial relationship between professional colleagues. The topics of discussion included parole prediction and the role of mental defects and crime, among others. They also shared ideas and factual information. What is most noteworthy though is Sutherland's strong praise for the Gluecks' work. For instance, in response to the forthcoming publication of 500 Criminal Careers, Sutherland wrote, in a letter dated September 27, 1929, that the book was "a very great contribution to the literature and methods of criminology" (Sutherland 1929 ). In the same letter Sutherland did raise some points of "minor importance" with regard to statistical computations and the Gluecks' interpretation of research on parole prediction with respect to weighting factors. Overall, however, the tone of the letters was upbeat, and, as late as a May 4, 1936, letter, Sutherland praised the Gluecks and expressed "astonishment" at their publication record (Sutherland 1936) .
The Gluecks in turn praised Sutherland's work. For instance, in 500 Criminal Careers (1930), the Gluecks discussed problems in major textbooks in the field with regard to assessment of recidivism rates. However, the Gluecks (1930, p. 7) noted that "E. H. Sutherland, in Criminology, does not fall into this fallacy of careless generalization in the direction of optimism." Similarly, with regard to Sutherland's second edition of Principles of Criminology, Sheldon Glueck's correspondence with Sutherland's publisher (J. B. Lippincott) stated that the text was "unquestionably the most satisfactory" on the subject and that Sutherland wrote with "objectivity," "temperateness," and "rational eclecticism" (S. Glueck 1934).
SHIFTING TIDES: THE SUTHERLAND-GLUECK DEBATE
Beginning in 1937, Sutherland began to shift his thinking and, as a consequence, his attitude toward the Gluecks' research. The buildup was slow at first and began with a review by Sutherland (1937b) of the Gluecks' Later Criminal Careers. The Later Criminal Careers (Glueck and Glueck 1937a) study was the second in a series focusing on 510 offenders released from the Massachusetts Reformatory. This particular book described the second five-year follow-up period after parole (1928-32). Sutherland's attention was centered largely on the two major conclusions of the study. First, improvement in behavior over time was attributed by the Gluecks "primarily to aging or maturation." And second, the major obstacle to reform through maturation was argued to be psychological dysfunction. Sutherland also critiqued almost every methodological aspect of the study, claiming, in a two-page review, that the information gathered was "scanty," that few of the offenders were "observed" firsthand, and that "the purpose of these studies has not been defined" (1937b, p. 185). His comments are interesting because an earlier study by the Gluecks (1930), identical in nature, had been praised by Sutherland (1934b, pp. 511, 546-47).
As to the substance of the findings, Sutherland strongly attacked the conclusion that "the reduction of delinquency was due to aging or maturation" (1937b, p. 185). He unambiguously stated that "there is no justification for this conclusion, either in statistics or logic. Aging, as the mere passing of time, has no significance as a cause" (1937b, p. 185). But Sutherland was even more perturbed by the Gluecks' psychologically oriented conclusion that mental and/or emotional difficulties impeded the process of reformation among former prisoners. Although as shown above he once agreed with this position, Sutherland argued that "this is the least satisfactory part of the book." He goes on to maintain in a few short sentences, and without documentation, that the psychiatrist at the institution (who made the evaluations before the follow-up when postrelease behavior was measured) had "a heavy case load and little time for careful examinations, and also had a general bias toward interpretation of delinquency as due to mental pathology" (1937b, p. 186). Ignoring the crucial fact that the classifications had predictive validity ( In the original piece, located in the Gluecks' archive at Harvard University, Sutherland critiqued in a forceful tone the Gluecks' conclusions regarding aging and maturational reform. He also began to express new views that foreshadowed his conversion to analytic induction (described in more detail below) as a methodological tool. With regard to the association between age and crime he wrote, "There is no statistical procedure by which a statistically significant association can be translated into a cause.... Moreover, the passing of time no more explains reformation than it explains the genesis of a depression or the election of an old man to the Senate" (1937c, p. 12).
13 For a published point-by-point response to the Sutherland review by a colleague of the Gluecks' from the Harvard Law School, see Hall (1937, pp. 389-93). 14 According to correspondence from Sutherland to Eleanor Glueck on January 11, 1938, the session was chaired by Ernest Burgess and was devoted to a discussion of Later Criminal Careers based on papers by Sutherland and C. E. Gehlke. Sutherland wrote, "I read the principal parts of your paper to the group, reading at least twothirds of it" (1938). This statement was in response to a request in a letter to Sutherland from the Gluecks dated December 14, 1937: "If you plan to present your paper in its original form, we are sure you will do us the courtesy of having our reply read at the same meeting" (Glueck and Glueck 1937c) . Whether the Gluecks actually expected Sutherland himself to read their reply to his critique of their book at a meeting organized to discuss their book is, to say the least, unclear.
More generally, Sutherland expressed his distaste for the factual search for the correlates of delinquency in a longitudinal perspective. He argued that it was of utmost importance that researchers first present a thesis and then attempt to test it. Noting his disregard of the search for key facts, Sutherland followed up his unpublished critique with a letter, dated December 4, 1937. Sutherland wrote to Sheldon Glueck about Later Criminal Careers, "You would have been much safer if you had presented your factual data without the thread of theory, but in my opinion research work of that factual nature are safe but useless. Every research study should, I believe, be organized around general propositions or general theory, and unless it can be so organized it is relatively futile" (1937d).
It is interesting that this passage reveals that Sutherland recognized the Gluecks were not sheer empiricists. Indeed, in his longer review he refers to the Gluecks' "theory of criminal behavior" and that they "fail to prove their hypotheses" (1937c, p. 17). In any case, Sutherland castigated the collection of empirical data without theory, yet at the same time rejected the Gluecks' substantive framework on age and crime and maturational reform. Paradoxically, in fact, he accused the Gluecks of trying to prove a preconceived theory of persistent criminality (1937c, pp. 3-4).
The Gluecks were sufficiently concerned with Sutherland's critique that they responded (Glueck and Glueck 193 7b) with a 25-page document that, to our knowledge, was never published. This response was titled "Analysis of Prof. Sutherland's Appraisal of Later Criminal Careers" and is dated December 13, 1937. It is surprising that the correspondence shows that some portion of the Gluecks' rejoinder was read by Sutherland himself at the 1937 meeting of the Sociological Research Association (see n. 14 above). In the response the Gluecks countered that they were not trying to prove any preconceived theories regarding age and crime: "We have no criminologic axes to grind. We search for facts as accurately as possible and on the basis of the findings we arrive inductively, and not a priori, at certain conclusions. The statement from Later Criminal Careers that you quote on pages 3 and 4 [of the unpublished critique] is not a preconception with which we started our work; it is a theory suggested by the evidence emerging from the facts" (1937b, p. 3). In the full response they also answered, point by point, Sutherland's "minor" criticisms regarding the number of cases followed up as well as other issues. 15 15 It is rather ironic to note that in the same year Sutherland was criticizing the Gluecks for their small sample size (N = 454), he published The Professional Thief (1937a), a case study of one. More generally, Sutherland conducted little, if any, They expressed more puzzlement, however, at Sutherland's views on methodology. In the Lazarsfeld tradition, the Gluecks tried to establish an age-crime relationship by ruling out (controlling for) other factors associated with age. Although admittedly crude by today's standards, the Gluecks' analysis was straightforward-after they had analyzed several competing variables, age and also psychological adjustment seemed to best predict desistance from crime. Their response to Sutherland reflects the Gluecks' general empirical stance:
Your statement (page 12) that "there is no statistical procedure by which a statistically significant association can be translated into a cause" is a well known truism in a sense; but the illustration you give [age cannot explain the election of an old man to senate] is obviously absurd and is assuredly not analogous to the association of aging with behavior. While it is true that the mere association of two factors does not necessarily mean that one is causal of the other, it is also true that in every field of science an association between factors that ought, in reason and experience, to be related does give the basis of a valid inference as to causation.... If one could not ever make such an inference from statistical associations, it is hard to see how any science would be possible. When Lindesmith came to Indiana University . .. I became acquainted with his conception of methodology as developed in his study of drug addiction. According to this conception, an hypothesis should fit every case in the defined universe, and the procedure to use is: State the hypothesis and try it out on one case; if it does not fit the facts, modify the hypothesis or else redefine the universe to which it applies, and try it on another case, and so on for case after case. The methodology consists in searching for negative cases, one negative case disproving the hypothesis. Although this involves several cases, it is not concerned with averages, standard deviations, or coefficients of correlation. The methodology assisted me greatly in formulating problems and in testing hypotheses. It is important to recognize here that the error of positivism when interpreted as a substantive theory of crime was not sociology's alone-it was embraced by biology, psychology, and economics as well. The difference, however, is that sociology was successful in its attempt to take over the study of crime (for details, see Gottfredson and Hirschi [1990] ; and Gaylord and Galliher [1988 As argued in a recent paper by Galliher and Tyree (1985, p. 111), Sutherland was driven by a strong "anti-psychiatry ideology," and he saw this issue as a "professional turf" concern in making the case for a sociological criminology with himself as its leader (see also Gaylord and 21 In this regard it is interesting to note Sheldon Glueck's bitter and hostile reaction: "The most confident and severest critics have been a group whose writings have the tone of fire-breathing chevaliers eager to do battle for that purest queen of the exact sciences, Sociology, to which the authors of Unraveling Juvenile Delinquency allegedly did not pay adequate tribute" (1960, p. 284). The Gluecks clearly did not take criticism well.
]).21 Sutherland's leadership role in this action was widely recognized-so much so that Robert Merton even compared Sutherland's Principles of Criminology to such disciplinary classics as Samuelson's Economics and Gray's Anatomy as books that "leave an enduring impress on generations of students" (1971, p. vii).
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Galliher 1988; and Goff 1986). Sutherland's intentions were not lost on his contemporaries either. As his former colleague Karl Schuessler writes, Sutherland had a "bias against psychiatry" (1973, p. xvii) and "did not broaden his theoretical model to accommodate biological and psychological factors. In fact, he was severely critical of those criminologists who stretched their framework to include every possible factor, however disparate those factors might be" (1973, p. x). Clearly, it came to serve both Sutherland's interests and those of the discipline to establish proprietary rights in the study of crime.
There is also little doubt that Sutherland accurately perceived his own role in spearheading the sociological undermining of the Gluecks. Indeed, in a manner destined to embitter the Gluecks, Sutherland alone reviewed almost all of their books in professional journals (mainly law reviews) in the 1930s and 1940s. In a letter to Sheldon Glueck dated February 11, 1944, Sutherland even wrote, "I refused three invitations from journals to review your Criminal Careers in Retrospect because I did not desire to acquire an institutional status as a critic of your work." However, he goes on to say that he did in fact write the review when he "felt that it would be possible to write a review which would be relatively formal" (1944b).
His 1944 letter also continued the dismissal of individual-level correlates of crime that was consistent with the new outlook of the 1939 edition of Principles. While writing to Sheldon Glueck to "assure you that I have a most kindly personal attitude toward you," he went on to criticize the relevance of age to crime, arguing that the relationship was only "slightly more than chance." Sutherland also attacked the Gluecks' long-standing hypothesis concerning the stability of antisocial behavior over the life course. In particular, he contradicted his 1924 book and argued that "I believe that you do not demonstrate that these childhood characteristics have more than a slight relationship to behavior in middle age" (1944b, p. 2). In fact, Sutherland repeated his earlier charge that this "was a preconception and not a finding" (1944b, p. 2; see also Sutherland's final and probably most severe attack on the Gluecks concerned forms of data collection and analysis. Quite simply, Sutherland went so far as to imply that the Gluecks fudged their data. His claim was expressed in several ways. In a published review he implied that the Gluecks used ex post facto psychiatric evaluations and thus that the mental diagnosis was "necessarily" associated with the behavior (Sutherland 1937b, p. 186). More damning were "informal" comments made in the 1937 review circulated among colleagues across the country. He stated, "When the data and methods are examined, they are found to be completely untrustworthy" (1937c, p. 14), and he specifically charged that the Gluecks "must have made their classification after the delinquency or nondelinquency of offenders during the second period was already known to them, as well as after the failure to meet economic or family responsibilities and the other aspects of behavior during the second period were already known to them. The classification is therefore nothing except an expression of the authors' a priori conception of the relationship between overt behavior and mental condition. Nothing except clerical errors could have prevented a high correlation between mental abnormality and persistence in criminal behavior" (1937c, pp. 15-16 ). With this alleged fatal flaw, not only could the Gluecks' data be dismissed, but their entire substantive framework, as judged by Sutherland, "breaks down completely" (1937c, p. 17) .
The Gluecks appeared quite aware of the underlying message of Sutherland's criticisms. As they wrote in their 25-page rejoinder, "You distinctly imply that we have somehow manipulated our materials to get the result for which we were looking from the beginning. This is a very serious charge to make and we are wondering how you could possibly have arrived at it. It is very startling, to say the least, that ... you could infer that we manipulate our materials" (1937b, p. 20). The Gluecks argued that the charge ought to be "ignored as undeserving of notice," but since Sutherland had, in their words, the "temerity" to make it (1937b, p. 20), they countered with the obvious fact that Sutherland ignored: "It seems quite self-evident that the psychiatrists who made the examinations at the different hospitals throughout the country at different times and without the knowledge that the Gluecks would come along, many years later, and make follow-up studies did not conspire with us beforehand to see that the unreformed would have a higher incidence of mental deviation than the reformed. They could not possibly have known, when they made the examinations, which of the men would many years later turn out to be recidivists and which would reform" Similarly, Galliher and Tyree (1985) examined Sutherland's research on the origins of sexual psychopath laws and found that he ignored evidence contrary to his hypothesis. Moreover, Galliher and Tyree discovered "curious lapses and inconsistencies in the evidence he [Sutherland] marshaled in support of his conclusions" (1985, p. 100). More specifically, they argue (1) that Sutherland did not systematically review the newspapers from the states he discussed, (2) that his conclusions about the press were based on a very selective sample of sensationalistic pieces, especially lurid magazine articles, and (3) that he ignored critics such as Tappan, Inbau, and Gault who questioned his claims. The selective attention to facts was attributed to Sutherland's strong "antipsychiatric ideology" (1985, p. 110).
We emphasize that, in our view, Sutherland was not driven by individual maliciousness or intentional dishonesty in his own work or in his attack on the Gluecks. Rather, Sutherland's behavior may be seen as socially conceived by the factors analyzed above-a substantive version of sociological positivism fused with a false criterion of causality supplied by analytic induction. In conjunction with his rising social position as the leading sociologist of crime, it seems less surprising that Sutherland selectively interpreted evidence in the process of dismantling the competition. In fact, it seems fair to suggest that Sutherland actually believed the Gluecks' data had to be wrong and the sociological perspective portrayed in the idea of differential association right.22
THE TRANSMISSION OF ACCEPTED WISDOM
Despite the unproven nature of Sutherland's charges against the Gluecks, the damage was done and took on a life of its own that remains to this day in sociology. The momentum was facilitated in large part by the social and institutional context within which both parties operated. Hav-22 It is beyond the scope of this paper to evaluate the research bearing on the validity of differential association theory. Besides, this has been done elsewhere-for excellent arguments that take opposing views see Kornhauser (1978) and Matsueda (1988) . It will come as no surprise to learn that the Gluecks did not think much of differential association. At one point Sheldon Glueck referred to the idea of differential association as "puerile" and as a "roof without a house" (1956, pp. 92, 99) . ing access to the benefits offered by a graduate sociology department, Sutherland became something of a magnet for Ph.D. students who would go on to carry the torch of differential association theory and a disregard for the Gluecks' research. In particular, Donald Cressey was a student of Sutherland's at Indiana University who later coauthored six editions of Principles. But there were also other prominent graduate students such as Albert Cohen and Lloyd Ohlin who were deeply influenced by Sutherland. As Cohen remarked in an interview with Laub (1983) about Indiana University in the late 1930s, at the height of the SutherlandGlueck debate, "I would say all of the better graduate students were in criminology. They were all studying with Sutherland. There was a sense that the department of sociology at that particular time was really the breeding ground of theory. You were there at the source. The most exciting things in criminological theory were happening right there and they all somehow had to do with differential association. Differential association was theoretically the end of the world" (Laub 1983, p. 186). Cohen's remarks seem entirely apt in describing Sutherland's dedication to differential association and inculcating a generation of students that would do likewise. Indeed, Cohen noted that Sutherland "functioned as a kind of a guru" (Laub 1983, p. 186) .
The Sutherland mystique even extends to the imputation of laudatory motives on the part of Sutherland in his judgments of the Gluecks. For example, Snodgrass has written that "Sutherland's obsession with honesty is no small reason for why he got into such a fracas with the Gluecks" (1972, p. 227). Schuessler writes that "he [Sutherland] was uncanny in his ability to spot errors in statistical logic and patient in locating the trouble-witness his unraveling of the Gluecks" (1973, p. xxxv). Similarly, Geis and Goff note that Sutherland's "writings are unsparing in their exposure of false syllogism, sloppy logic, the unsupported inference, and the generalization rooted in infancy rather than fact" (1983, p. xxi). Finally, Snodgrass (1972) argues that in his review (1934b) of One Thousand Juvenile Delinquents Sutherland "was one of the first to point to the Gluecks' exaggerations and omissions of data," and he goes on to state, without any documentation, that this is "a charge which has subsequently been repeated and enlarged, and a fact which might insure that [the Gluecks'] research will come to be discredited, if not disregarded, by future students and historians of the discipline" (1972, p. 244; emphasis added).
At the same time, key aspects of the Gluecks' perspective as well as their own particular institutional/historical context also contributed to their demise. We have identified six specific reasons why sociology, especially after Sutherland's death in 1950, was so hostile to the Gluecks' work. First, the Gluecks had a tendency to infuse their works with moral statements that reflected middle-class biases. For instance, in regard to the management of income, the Gluecks wrote that families of delinquents were "living from day to day, borrowing without thought of their ability to make reimbursement and showing little comprehension of the value of limiting their expenditures to conform to a meager income" (1950a, p. 108) . On all accounts, the Gluecks simply viewed delinquents and their families as inferior. Moreover, although the Gluecks' data were derived from multiple reports describing actual behaviors, the Gluecks often injected moral judgments in their summary coding scheme using categories such as good, fair, and poor to describe these behaviors (see Glueck and Glueck [1950a] for numerous examples).
Second, as mentioned above, the Gluecks were atheoretical in their approach to the study of crime. But more than that, the Gluecks were antitheory. Although they emphasized an empirical tradition and sought to identify any and all characteristics that may be related to crime and delinquency, they regarded abstract theory as idle speculation and not useful from a scientific view. Thus, the Gluecks did not present a theory of crime or even any systematic theoretical ideas in their numerous works. In fact, their idea of a theoretical statement was to present a "tentative causal formula or law" that merely summarized their findings distinguishing offenders from nonoffenders (see Glueck and Glueck 1950a, pp. 281-82).
Third, despite embracing a multiple-factor approach, the Gluecks downplayed or ignored traditional sociological variables like stratification, peer group, culture, and community characteristics. As Snodgrass has noted (1972, p. 9), the Gluecks' focus was "bio-constitutional and psycho-social." Specifically, the Gluecks downplayed social factors (e.g., delinquent associates) in favor of morphology, temperament, and early family influences (see Glueck and Glueck 1943, p. 69; 1950a; 1956; 1962; 1968, p. 170 ). Overall, the Gluecks' research reflected a restricted range of interest in key sociological variables presumed to be related to crime.
Fourth, recall that Sheldon Glueck was a law professor and Eleanor Glueck a soft-money research assistant. By function of their social position within the academic institution, the Gluecks were precluded the opportunity to train graduate students and develop the sort of following that Sutherland had. Quite simply, no one had a stake in defending the Gluecks. We believe this context is crucial in understanding the transmission of Sutherland's legacy.
Fifth, our review of the Glueck papers, especially their personal correspondence (i.e., notes and letters), leads to the conclusion that the Gluecks suffered from social awkwardness and a severe difficulty in public relations. Whereas Sutherland was well liked and perceived to be "humble" and "gentle" (see Laub's [1983] interviews with Cressey, Co-hen, and Ohlin), the Gluecks were stubborn and pompous and had great difficulty accepting any criticism of their work, justified or not, as something other than a personal attack on their integrity (see also S. Glueck 1960). This no doubt impeded their attempts to establish a cadre of supporters.
Sixth, and perhaps most important, the Gluecks' research was driven by pragmatic concerns. More precisely, they sought to influence social policy through the use of their prediction tables in two distinct ways. One was to improve the process of decision making by judges, probation officers, parole boards, and military officials.23 The second was to identify potential delinquents at school age or perhaps even as early as age two and three (see E. The Gluecks even envisioned a criminal justice system based on "the rational exercise of discretion enlightened by the reports of psychiatric, psychological, and social workers who ought . . . to be indispensable adjuncts to criminal courts and to classifying agencies and correctional establishments" (S . Glueck 1962, p. 139) . Furthermore, the Gluecks encouraged the use and expansion of court clinics and child guidance centers. The result of this concern with social policy and the explicit promotion of the professional interests of the field of psychiatry was to further alienate the Gluecks from mainstream sociology as reflected by the works of Sutherland.24 Having placed the Sutherland-Glueck debate in social and historical context, we now turn to a brief assessment of the Gluecks' legacy. If Sutherland and common wisdom are correct (see also Snodgrass 1972, p. 244), then the Gluecks' research should have long ago faded into irrelevance. As it turns out, it is not even necessary to rely on the Gluecks' own defense to show the exaggerated nature of Sutherland's critique. Indeed, it is ironic that, despite numerous personal flaws and narrowly conceived professional interests, the Gluecks' substantive research in criminology remains strong.
A REVISIONIST ASSESSMENT OF THE GLUECKS' RESEARCH
The Gluecks could not have known the implications of their work for modern criminology. To speak of their "contributions" to present research is thus, as shown by Jones (1977, pp. 282-89) , to commit the error of "presentism." We avoid this tendency by assessing the validity of their research methodology and substantive conclusions-that is, do they stand up to external verification? Moreover, to the extent that the current research agenda in criminology is simply an unacknowledged version of the Gluecks', the validity and importance of their work is further increased. Our assessment is based on a brief overview of four fundamental claims made by the Gluecks that, as detailed above, were dismissed by Sutherland.
Age and crime. -In a recent and highly cited article in this Journal, Hirschi and Gottfredson (1983) tended (see also Gottfredson and Hirschi 1986) that crime declines with age and that this pattern holds true even for the most active offenders (career criminals). Their evidence is based on a comprehensive review of extant data on the age-crime relationship covering many different cultures and time periods.
Whether or not the age-crime curve is "invariant" across time and space, the research literature clearly shows that the Gluecks were correct about the fundamental importance of age, and that their evidence collected over 40 years ago remains some of the best available on the subject. As Gottfredson and Hirschi concluded, "The Gluecks' data are corroborated by other sources" (1988, p. 50, see also pp. 39, 49). Even the most vocal critics of Hirschi and Gottfredson agree, unlike Sutherland, that age is an important predictor of crime and have also turned explicitly to the Gluecks' data for insight (see, e.g., Blumstein, Cohen, and Farrington 1988, pp. 12-13).
Criminal careers and longitudinal research. -The field of criminology is currently embroiled in a bitter dispute over the value of longitudinal research and the criminal-career paradigm. The spark for this dispute was the publication of a recent report by the National Academy of Sciences (NAS; Blumstein et al. 1986 ) wherein it was concluded that longitudinal research was necessary to study the causes of criminal careers. Moreover, the NAS report called for major new research initiatives to estimate four parameters of the criminal-career paradigm: participation (the distinction between those who engage in crime and those who do not), frequency (the rate of criminal activity of those who are active), seriousness of offenses committed, and career length (the length of time an offender is active). It is argued that valid estimates of these parameters are needed to determine effective crime-control policies in terms of selective incapacitation and individual deterrent effects (Blumstein et al. 1986 , pp. 202-4). However, Gottfredson and Hirschi (1986 ) have forcefully attacked the NAS report, basically by claiming that longitudinal research is unnecessary and that selective incapacitation is impossible to achieve.
It is much beyond the scope of this paper to resolve the debate over longitudinal research and criminal careers. However, it is not necessary to do so to acknowledge that the Gluecks were the first to systematically put forth the criminal-career paradigm. As noted earlier, the Gluecks originally made the distinction between frequency and participation, arguing that the causes of recidivism were different from the causes of onset (Glueck and Glueck 1930 , 1934a , 1945 Stability of crime and deviance. -One of the Gluecks' early and major contributions to criminology was their hypothesis of stability of crime and deviance across the life course. Unlike Sutherland, who saw criminality as an ever-changing construct dependent on changing social influences, the Gluecks documented the relative stability of betweenindividual differences in crime. The Gluecks' hypothesis can be seen as one of "longitudinal consistency," which concerns "the extent to which individuals in a group retain their relative position on a certain dimension or characteristic . . . at different points in time" (Olweus 1979 , p. 852).
As they argued in a section of Delinquents and Nondelinquents in Perspective aptly titled "The Past Is Prologue," "while the majority of boys originally included in the nondelinquent control group continued, down the years, to remain essentially law-abiding, the greatest majority of those originally included in the delinquent group continued to commit all sorts of crimes in the 17-25 age-span" (Glueck and Glueck 1968, p. 170). In a related argument, the Gluecks' also hypothesized that early life experiences had strong effects on crime in the adult years.
What do the data say? The evidence on longitudinal consistency is unequivocally clear-antisocial behavior is a remarkably stable phenomenon (Loeber 1982 Social control, the family, and delinquency. -Hirschi's (1969) influential Causes of Delinquency stated the now widely cited reformulation of assumptions about human nature implicit in differential association theory. As he argued, the question is not why do they do it, but rather "Why do men obey the rules of society: Deviance is taken for granted; comformity must be explained" (1969, p. 10). Consider now Sheldon Glueck's earlier conceptualization of the problem, which also directly contradicts differential association theory: "What is there to be learned about simple lying, taking things that belong to another, fighting, and sex play? . . . One must conclude that it is not delinquent behavior that is learned; that comes naturally. It is rather non-delinquent behavior that is learned. . . . Law-abiding character formation is a hard-won process" (1956, pp. 94-95). The Gluecks were thus early proponents of a socialcontrol perspective, arguing that the child must be socialized to overcome natural asocial or antisocial impulses. Although unsystematic, the Gluecks' notion of social control led them to study the role of families, schools, opportunities (e.g., peers and use of leisure time), and formal sanctions in explaining crime and delinquency.
Of all the factors they studied, however, the Gluecks clearly focused most attention on the family. They identified the key predictors of delinquency as inconsistent and/or lax disciplinary practices by parents, low supervision and monitoring of the youth's behavior, and attenuated attachment between parent and child (1950a, p. 261). These same family process factors have subsequently been shown to be sturdy and strong predictors of juvenile delinquency in a variety of settings-including different time periods, geographic location, age groups, and methodology (see esp. 
CONCLUSIONS
There is no doubt that Edwin Sutherland made substantial contributions to the field of criminology, especially in the areas of white-collar and professional crime and the development of the theory of differential association. Unlike other contemporaries (e.g., Clifford Shaw, Henry 25 We also conducted a detailed validation of the Gluecks' data from the Unraveling study. Using the original handwritten interview schedules currently preserved at the Henry A. Murray Research Center of Radcliffe College in Cambridge, Mass., we successfully reconstructed the full longitudinal data set and found the data to be consistent with published reports as well as our own logical consistency checks. Moreover, we were able to trace and interview several members of the Gluecks' original research team for the Unraveling study, including Richard LaBrie, Mildred P. Cunningham, Sheila Murphrey, and Mary H. Moran. Taking all this information into account, we uncovered no evidence of anything other than meticulous data collection.
McKay, Thorsten Sellin) Sutherland was also one of the first to offer a systematic theory that attempted to explain individual-level as well as macro-level differences in crime. He is thus appropriately revered as one of the most important criminologists to date, and his work continues to influence modern research (see Matsueda 1988) .
Nevertheless, this state of affairs should not blind us to the brute force of Sutherland's critique of the Gluecks' work. Reflecting broader concerns about the shape and image of criminology in society, Sutherland's criticisms stemmed from his rejection of the multiple-factor approach, his adherence to a substantive version of sociological positivism, and his position as the dominant criminologist of the 20th century. When supplied with a false criterion of causality offered by his conversion to analytic induction, Sutherland felt free to dismiss the Gluecks' empirical contributions to criminological knowledge.
The power of Sutherland's critique is hard to overestimate. To this day sociological positivism is dominant and the Gluecks are often seen as relics of a distant past. Having been reified by the academic community, the Gluecks' fate has become so much a social fact that the bestselling criminology text in America (Siegel 1989) , with over 1,000 references and 550 pages, cites the Gluecks but once. In true Sutherland tradition, the citation is to mesomorphy-by linking the Gluecks' work to "Lombrosians and other biological determinists" it is summarily rejected as "methodologically unsound" and "invalid" (Siegel 1989 , p. 126). By contrast, our analysis has provided a revisionist assessment of the Gluecks' contributions to fundamental issues in criminological research that reaches the opposite conclusion.
Perhaps more important, however, our paper demonstrates the need to understand the processes by which knowledge is socially constructed. In particular, through a contemporary look at the Sutherland-Glueck debate we have provided new insights into the historical and intellectual context of criminological thought. Our findings support recent developments in intellectual historiography, which asserts that classic works in the history of ideas cannot be dealt with according to ordinary processes of causal explanation, but that their understanding presupposes a grasp of the authors' intentions and that this in turn requires the reconstruction of the conventions governing discussion of the issues of concern (see esp. Jones 1977; 1986, p. 618; Beirne 1987).
Moreover, we extended this approach to include an investigation of not only the historical context of the Sutherland-Glueck debate but the social positions and institutional settings they occupied within that context (see Camic 1987) . We showed that the formation and substance of both Sutherland's and the Gluecks' positions were deeply affected by their respective methodological, disciplinary, and even institutional bi-ases. To Sutherland, the Gluecks' multiple-factor approach to crime represented a symbolic threat to the intellectual status of sociological criminology of which he was the leader, and hence his attack on the Gluecks' interdisciplinary thought served the larger interest of sociology in establishing proprietary rights to criminology. To the Gluecks, Sutherland represented abstract theorizing about crime from a unilateral (i.e., sociological) perspective. Moreover, this general theory was divorced from any social policy designed to prevent and control delinquency. Given the Gluecks' interest in using predictive techniques for pragmatic ends as well as their own lofty views of the importance of their research, they had no choice but to rebut Sutherland's critiques and launch a counterattack on all criminologists who disagreed with their position. The accepted fates of Sutherland and the Gluecks are thus interwoven and cannot be understood simply by reference to the truth or falsity of their research findings but instead must be placed within the social and institutional context of their debate.
In sum, our efforts support Jones's sobering yet penetrating conclusion: "For surely it is curious that, at the same time that modern sociologists struggle to expand their imaginations and thus to develop new ideas to account for the complexities of human behavior, there is nothing of which we are more ignorant than the nature of the process by which such ideas emerge, are received, grow, change, and are eventually surpassed" (1977, p. 311). This is perhaps nowhere more true than in criminology, where "new" developments are constantly offered in what seems to be a collective amnesia about the past. We hope to have counteracted this tendency by specifying the social foundations of one of the major developments in criminological knowledge this century.26
